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Memorandum 
NMM:RBD:SAM:ar~N 
(213) 894-561.5 
Subject 
Status Report on the War Crimes Tribunal 
in Rwanda 
Dme 
Janu&JY 12. 1995 
..... 
To 
MARK M RICHARD 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
From 
.STEPHEN A. MANSPIBLD ~ ··. 
Deputy Chief,. Public Corruption and 
Government Fraud Section 
U.S. Attol'l)ey'a Office . 
· Central District of California 
..... 
In December 1994, a U.S. government team· aecoinpanh~d 'the Chief Prosecutor of the 
· . U.N. War Crimes Tnbunal during a brief trip to Rwanda. The Chief Pr~ecutor conducted 
introductory meetings concerning the work of the Tribunal with political. mUitUY and U.N. 
leaders in Rwan~. The U.S. team met with U.N. officials to inspect possible sites for an 
.. investigative office in Kigali and possible accommodations for investigators and prosecutors 
who migbt be detailed in Kigali. The U.S. team also discussed overall security concerns with 
the U.N. Deputy Force Commander and examined logistical issues relating to the feasibility 
of equipping and securing an investigative office. 
The u.s: team consisted .of FBI Special Agent" Jerry Dyer, DOJ computer and logistics 
specialist Usa Pollsar, Steve Carltont a computer. specialist from an outside ~ ~iid me. · 
This was the second U.S. government trip to Rwanda. The first trip occurred in September· 
October 1994 and involved a preliminary assessment of investigative opportunides in 
Rwanda. The summary repon concerning that trip, which is attached, recommended that 
certain steps be taken to preserve evidence, develop a strategic investigation plan, establish 
and equip an investigat~ve office and examine security ·issues relating to the ;possible 
· deployment of U.S. personnel. 
In November 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted the resolution establishmg ~the 
. · tribunal for Rwanda. Chief Prosecutor Goldstone announced in Rwanda that the Tn'bunaJ· 
. will focus its efforts on the prosecution of the top military and political ofticfals responsible 
for planning and implementing the massive war crimes in Rwanda. Goldstone is interested 
· in staffing an investigative office In KlgaU as soon as poSSJ"blc beginning u early as February. 
1995. Goldstone has r~quested U.S. agents and prosecutors as wen as law eDforcetnem 
personnel from other nations. Set forth below are some matters that should be comidered 
before decfdins on the extent and manner in which ~e Department may ~uppon this effon. 
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1.. OFFICE AND ACCOMMODATION SITES 
The U.N. Deputy Force C~mmander convinced me that UNAMIR·fullf·appreciates itS 
obligation under the-Security Council's .resolution to provide security for the Tribunal's 
activities in Rwand8. In terms of office space, he proposed ·that prefab offices for 
investigators be constr~ted and placed op a _grassy field within UNAMlR's new military 
compound site. This would be one of the most secure sites in Rwanda. However.! m~ch 
construction and renovation 'Yill be required before UNAMIR can move its headquarters 
to this new site and secure lt. UNAMIR officials estimate that it will be completed in 
·February. Baled on my inspection of the site and my experiences m Rwanda, I wou~d _ 
project a completion date in the Summe~ of 199S at tbc earliest. 
' . 
To satisfy the immediate need for office space, I examined a building just outside tbe 
present UNAMIR compound, which was formerly o~pied by UNICEF. The location of 
thls building makes it quite secure. It sits between the present UNAMIR compound (which 
will be convened Jo UNAMIR housing when the compound moves t9 its new site) and 
existing .UNAMIR housing. It is surrounded by a security fence and has a guard house. 
UNAMIR promised 24 hour armed guard security fot this building. While we were in 
Rwanda, I recommended to Justice Goldstone that·he move quickly to obtain control of tbis 
building. Based o~ the post-war conditions of numerous other buildings I have examined 
in Kigali, the former UNICEF bullding is as good as we could e~er expecL 
Lisa Polisar will be sub~tt~g a report concerning the suitability of 1hls office from a 
logistical standpoint. The building is currently vacant except for one tenant occupying ~he 
· third floor. We .were told that this tenant should be moving out _in the very ncar future. For 
obvious security and confidt;ntiallty reasons, this would be necessalj' before investigators· 
could occupy the building. · 
Accommodations, however, still pose a problem. The most compelling illustration of the 
problem is what we encountered during our Qrief visit last month. Despite the fact that we 
were travelling with the Chief Prosecuto~'s delegation and all Rwandan and U.N. officials 
. were primed to show strong support for war crime prosecutions) the U.S. team was sent to 
~he Meridien Hotel for accommodations. This stench·ridden hotel sufferccl much damage 
and destruction during the war. Much repair work is needed. During the war, thousands 
elf refugees were forced to live in the rooms, hallways and lobbies of the hoteL Due to the 
overcrowding inside 8nd the fear of going outside, residents defecated on the floors 
accounting for the terrible stench within. Two rooms in this hotel were provided for our 
group of three men and one woman. Due to the broken wlndo~ and cbards of glass on the 
·ooor in one of the rooms, we were all forced.to sleep ·in one smaD room With pcrmanentlj · 
closed ·wipdows. · 
· This lllcidcnt. i1 not reported t~ complain about discomforts experienced during ou~ short 
Visit. (Our group was quite rugged and had a hardy laugh about the adverse 
· accommodations.) -The problem is that when I inquired with UNAMIR about possible 
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accommodations for war crimes-mvestigators who might be detailed fn Rwanda in the near 
future, the Meridien Hotel Was offered as the best option. The principall'cason for offering 
the Meridien is the large number of rooms there. From a security standpoin~ U.N. officials 
believe it is easier an.P more effective to provide home security if all tribunal personnel live 
under one roof. However, when I asked how 24 hour armed security would be provided at 
the Meridien Hotel, ~ere was no clear plan. In fact, there were questions about whether 
t~e owners of the hotel-would permit armed U.N. soldiers to be stationed fn and aboutJhe 
hoteL 
When I inquired about other hoUsing options I was told that the Hotel Diplomat might have 
rooms aVailable. ·(I stayed at the Diplomat for three weeks during my first trip to Rwanda; · 
there was no running water and periodic electricity.) Upon inspecti~n during this trip, the 
piplomat had ·improved since· last FaD. The desk clerk indicated that there is usually 
running water now and the electricity problems appear solyed. The .Diplomat,. however, 
would not have a sufficient number of rooms to house all investigators, althoush it could 
possibly handle the U.S. t~am. Of course this would not satisfy the U.N. security goal of 
keeping all tribunal staff housed in one place. 
Another housing option for U.S. investisators and proseeutors is the former residence of the 
. -q.s. Ambassador. During my meeting with him in Kigali last month he offered it to me 
and pledge_d his support for the· war crimes prosecution effort. The house has app~oximately 
four bedrooms and is surrou~ded by a fence with a guard house. It suffered damage during 
the war and needs substantial repairs (mostly to the kitchen and windows) before it would 
be habitable. · 
In sum, my impression from this trip is that no one has taken any concrete steps to secure 
suitable and s~fe accOmmodations for detailees who might be stationed in KigaU. Obviously, 
fuJiy satisfactory arrangements must be made b~fore anyone Js detaned to Rwanda. The 
problem in rmding safe and suitable accommodations in Rwanda raise~ the larger, threshold 
question: Should the Tn"bunal' s investigative offices be headquartered in Rwanda or in a 
.neighboring Afriean nation (or the Hague) where it would be safer and more comfortable? 
2. LOCATION OF OffiCE HBAOOUARTERS· 
The ·current thinking by Justice Goldstone is that office headquarters for investigators and 
prosecutors should be in Kigali. In contrast, everyone seems to agree that the Tribunal (ie. 
judges, clerks and co~rtrooms) will not be located in Rwanda because of security alncema 
and the difficulty in attractiQg good judges if they were required .to Jive in Rwanda. For the 
same ·reasons that Judges should not be stationed_ Jn Rwanda, I believe serious thougbt 
should be given to whether i~vestigators and prosecutors should be detailed on a fuU-time 
basis in Rwanda. 
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The arguments in support of the current proposal for detailing investigators on a f~ll time· 
basis in Kigali are: 1) investigators should be where the evidence is located, 2) a Kigali office 
avoids the inefficiency and expense of frequent travel to Rwanda from an outside officCt and 
3)'havins a war crim~ investigative office in Rwanda (even if it is not the coun itself) will 
mollify the Rw8Jldan government which has placed tremendous political pressure on the 
U.N. to locate the Tribunal in Rwanda. 
First, it makes sense to put criminal investigators where the evidence is. The problem liCre 
is that· the evidence is not solely in Kigali where the investigators w~uld be stationed. 
Witnesses will also be located throughout the country in vlllages, in the refugee camps ~t the 
borders, and, quite probably, in other countries where sources live pr have fled. In fact, 
substantial documentary evidence from the former government, while ·presently in Kigali 
government offices, should be sent out of Rwanda to a safe office where it can be properly 
translated. analyzed, organized and preserved in a secure setting. 
Second; as indicated above, subs.ta~tial .. travel will still be. necessary even if th~ ofiiee is 
located in Kigali. Based on my·experience· travelling in the Rwandan countryside after the 
war, such travel is veey time-consuming because of serious securi~ concerns and poor road 
conditions. Significant advance planning, research and coordination· is necessmy before one 
can safely and effectively travel in the fjeld in Rwanda. Traveling to such sites will require 
the same time-consuming advance planning whether it is from Kigali or a location outside · 
of Rwanda. Flights into Rwanda are not the problem. Travel throughout Rwanda is the 
problem. Moreover, the time and expense of travel to crime sites from outside the countly · 
did not appear to hamper unduly the Tribunal's work in the former Yugoslavia. There, 
investigators and prosecuton stationed at the Hague travelled to the former Yugoslavia for 
investigative purposes and were able to bring their first indictment in Jess t~ six mo·nths. 
Third, detailing investigaton and prosecutors in Kigali to create a "Tribunal presence" in · 
Rwanda causes the same problems for these professionals as it does for.judges and court 
. clerks~ it is dangerous and will make it difficu.lt to attract good investigators. Furtberinore, 
the security concerns s.hould not be understated. If the allegations under investigation are 
true that a group of hard·lin~ eXtremist Hutus assassinated their president as pa~ o( a 
genocidal plan to kill systematically over 500,000 Tutsis, then 1t is more than merely possible 
that a han~ful of Hutu guerrillas could surreptitiously infiltrate KigaU and murder one or 
more in~estigators or toss a hand grenade into the investigative offices to destroy e~dence. 
In addition.· detailing investigators in Kigali on a full-time basi~ will increase burn out and 
add unnecessary s~ess. From my experience in Rwanda during last September and October, 
the lifeatylc in Kigali· is one of intcns~ work ... long, hard days, soven days a week. Thi& 
·Important work is very demanding. With nothing else to do in Kigali, the U.N. and relief 
agency personnel are in a constant work mode. . Becaus.e of the serious security concerns 
outside of Kigali and the warning that land mines are possibly everywhet;e (even along wen 
traveled roads in Kigali). walldna throush the scenic countryside as an occasional escape· 
fr~m the intense work environment is not possible. · Du.ring my first trip to Kigali, ~AMIR 
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reported that an average of two children per week were being blown up by land mines in 
and around rcaidcntial and commercial areas in Kigali. h a rule, one walks only where 'ars 
have safely traveled. 
For ali of these reasons. an alternative approach for the location of the ~estiaative 
he~quanen should tie considered. For example, the investigative headquaner5 could be 
loc~ted in a safe neighboring African nation (as presently is the plan for the Tribunal). 
There, strategic inv.estiga tive planning, organizing and reporting could take place. The time- . 
consuming tasks of-document interpretation, r~vJew, analysts, and orsanizatfon should take 
place at such a secure location rather- tllan in Kigali. In · my experience in complex 
investigations, such tasks require substantial time. There is no reason such tasks should not . 
be performed in a pleasant and safe environmen~ if possible.. 
·A special in-country investigative offiee should also be established in Iagali. It would be 
occupied successively .by rotating investigating teams traveling to Rwanda on speclflc 
investigative missions from office headquarters. The trips to the field in Rwanda could last 
·between 1 and 3 weeks based on what seems appropriate given the mission. These missions 
should be carefuUy planned at headquarters in· terms ... of safety, logistics and substantive 
strategy .. They should also be intensive with the idea that lengthy reporting actMties and 
detailed strategiZing sessions should take place back at headquarters rather than in the field 
or in the Kigali office. The Kigali office could be based in the former UNICBF building 
d~bcd above. It would not be neeessary to move to larger offices in the new UNAMIR. 
compound in ~he future (as tentatively planned) because the office will only need to house 
one or two rotating invest3gative ·teams at a time. Rotation of investigative teams could be 
scheduled to ensure that there is always a ·significant "Tribunal presence• in Kigali. After. 
an intensive and tiring mission in lhe field, opportunities for R&R would eXist after 
necessary· reporting has been completed at headquaners. 
The .most significant benefit of this approach is that it substantiaJly reduces the security risks 
that result from the proposal to station investigators in Kigali on a fuU-time basis. While 
. security risks wUJ alwayi exist during Rwanda field missions, with less overall tjme in Rwanda 
· and less predictable work and lifestyle patterns in Rwanda .. investigators wDI be much-harder 
. targets ·to hit and less like •sitting ducks". This approach also reduces bum out and increases 
the chance of attracting the most qualified people for this difficult and challenging 
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3. THE ORQANIZATION STRUCTURE ANQ ROT P-S OF PROSECUTORS 
AND INVESTIGATORS. 
It is unclear at this point what. roie U.S. prosecutors and Investigators will play in the 
Rwanda Trfbunal. A Deputy Prosecutor has not been selected yet and it is unclear how 
much authority he or she will be given to create the organization .structure and practices. 
The Chief of Investigations at the Hague, who accompanied us in Rwanda last month, 
prepared a proposed organization chart, which is attached. It is based on the structure in 
place at the Hague. It is unclear If this will, in fact, be adopted in Rwanda. It is quite an 
odd model from a U.S. perspective and raises questions about how U.S. personnel would 
be utUized and when they would be needed. Under this model, only three prosecutors are 
designated to tzy cases. Other prosecutors work as WJegal officers' on investigative teams and 
report to agents or policemen who serve as •team leaders". 
Also unclear to me is what Influence, if any, the U.S. might have on tbc. design of .the 
organizational structure. I believe we should carefully explore these issues.in deciding how 
and when U.S. resources can be best committed to this im_pOrtant mission.. If it would be 
worthwhile, we could meet to discuss these matters jn more detail. I can be reached at 
(213) 894-S6iS or 6974 (W) or (818) 793-6776 (H). 
cc Kenneth Hams 
Senior Trial Attorney 
DOJ Office of International Affairs 
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ME:MORANPUM · 
To: Mark M Richard 
·Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Drew C Arena 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Director, Office of International Programs. 
Mark Steinberg 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
George W. Proctor 
Director, Office of International Affairs 
From: Stephen A. Mansfield 
Deputy Chief, Public Corruption and 
Government Fraud Section 
U.S .. Atto~ey' s Office 
Central District of California 
(213) 894-5615 
Re: . Summary of U.S. Government ~vestigative 
Detail in Rwanda 
Date: October 18, 1994 
This a summary report of our recent trip to Rwanda. As you knoW, our 
U.S. Government (USG) tc.~m was provided to the U.N. Human Rights Cent.er in. · 
respo~ to its. request for international assistance in initiating formal criminal 
invesrlga tions into the aU~gations of genocide and grave violations of intematJonal 
humanitarian Jaw in Rwanda. . 
. · Our team consisted of five members: one FBI Agent, one DOD attorney, twO 
State Department attorneys and, on behalf of DOJ, myself. Once in Rwanda, we were 
jo~ed by a Finnish attorney, au embassy poHtlcal counsel who the U.N. provided to assist 
us. No other countries were represented in ttus_mission. The USG team departed for 
Rwanda, via Geneva for briefings, on September 18, 1994 .. The team conducted 
investigations in .Rwanda from SeptembC!r 21 until October S. Duriitg this trip, the team 
in~erviewed more than 2S witnesses, collected documefltary and other taDgtble evidence 
and established important contacts with government officials, miHtary leaders, and. non· 
governmental organfiations, which will be extremely useful for futUre :investigations. 
Three members of our team returned to the U.S. on October 7, 1994. Crystal Nix, 
Special Assistant to the Legal Advisor for the State Department and I returned to the 
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·u.s. on October 8~ 1994,~ after stopping in Geneva to brief U.N. officials on our trip and 
coordinate future actions. 
INITIAL MEETINGS IN GENEVA 
On September 19th and 20th, the USG tcwn met with U.N .. ofticJals in Geneva 
.for briefings. To facilitate our transportation and security in Rwanda we were aC®rd_ed 
the status of U.N. agents conducting preliminary 'criminal investigations for the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. We were provided appropriate U.N. credentials, 
which were quite useful ·to us in Rwanda. While in Geneva, we aJso met with the 
Commission of Experts for Rwanda, a group of African representatives charsed with 
responsibUity for conducting preliminary investigations in Rwauda·and making 
recommendations t~ the U.N. concerning future aetion (On September 30th, for 
example, the Commission issued a report recommending the establishment of an 
international tnbunal for Rwanda.) The Commission informed us of their prior 
investigative efforts, which appeared quite general and sporadic in nature. The 
CoDimiss~on .suggested three field sites that they b~lieved warranted further investigation. 
The High Commissioner for· Human Rights asked me to serve as Interim Head of 
tbe Office of ~pecial Investigations, which consisted of our group plus all other 
-prosecutors, investigators and forensic experts offering assistance in the future. In. 
_ addition to providing investigative leadership to our group whi1c in Rwanda and other. · 
nations providing assistance thereafter, I was asked tQ formalize and coordinate a 
criminal investigative structure in Rwanda to allow a Chief Prosecutor, once appointed, 
to begin expeditiously long-term criminal investigations. 
JN'VESIIGATIVE ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA 
Our investigative activities in Rwanda are summarized in my October 2nd 
memorandum to the Chief, Speclal Procedures, Center for Human Rights, a copy of 
which is attached. Also attached is my October 14th summary report to the U.N. 
Co~ssion of Experts.· Finally, to Dlustrate the need for coordination of activities iD · ·· 
Rwanda, I have attached. my memorandum of September 27th defining the respective 
. roles of criminal investigators and field officers. This policy statement was endorsed by 
the High Commissioner for .Human Rights in a subsequent memorandum by him to the 
Chief of the Field Operation in Rwanda. · 
QBPARTIJRB MBETINGS .JN GENEvA 
Upon departJng Bwanda, we stopped in Geneva for briefings a~ the U.N. We 
briefed tbe Commission of Experts, the U.S. Ambassador in Geneva, the Assistant 
Secretazy of State ·for Human Rights. and the Chie( Special Procedures;-Center for 
Human Rights. I also met with the High Commissioner for Ruman Rights who aked 
that I remain as Interim Head of Special Investigations (acting out of Los Angeles) for 
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the purpose of coordinating futureactMties of Jaw enforcement professionals offered to 
the t;.N. by other nations. . 
In that regard, while in Geneva, I met with two Spanish forensic experts who 
were eaeer to begin oquicldy exhumations in Rwanda. Because of the significance and 
sensitivity of such investigative activity, I directed them Dot to conduct any physical 
samplilii or scientific analysis .until after they had met w.ith·and gained the approval of-a 
ClUcf Prosecutor. (This is consistent witb what Justice Goldstone indicated to ~e in a 
meeting prior to our Rwanda trip.) They indicated that they would comply with this 
directive. ·The Spanish forensic team is, nevertheless, extremely interested in doing 
something immediately.. To satisfy this need and avoid unsupervised investigative activity, 
we proposed that they perform a needs assessment of investigative opportunities in 
Rwanda based on observation alone. While I managed to delay such a trip until late 
October, their departure date is rapidly approaching. Tomorrow, in my meeting with 
Justice OoJdstonc, I will advise him of this and ask that he take appropriate steps to 
delay or supervise their inves.tigative activities. ·Other experts with appropriate 
qualifications will also need to be interviewed before any significant forensic work can be 
done. 
CONCWSION 
. In our meeting this week, I would like to discuss the possible future role that our 
govemnient can play in facilitating formal criininal investigations in Rwanda. I do not 
believe that future G hQrc investigative steps(~ visits to field sites for interviews) 
should taken at this time. Rather, the enormity and complexity of the crimes in Rwanda 
demand a long-term strategic investigation plan devised by the Chief Prosecutor. It is .. 
unclear how quickly a Chief Prosecutor for Rwanda can formally begin work. What is 
clear from my Investigation is that. a number of things can and. shQuld be done now, prior . 
to the formal appointment of a Chief Prosecutor, to preserve evidence against loss or 
destruction and to estabUsb a structure and an equipped investigative office that WJ11 be 
necessary for long·term investigations . 
./ . 
For example, important documen~ from the foiiner government must· continue to 
be located and obtahled. These may provide circumstantial or even direct evidence of 
acts related to .a plan. of genocide. ·Unfortunately, as we learned in our investigation, the 
current ·government bas been altering certain of these documents by their current ~ 
prac:Uce of handwriting comments on such documents. While I hav~ met with the 
Minister of Interior and asked that this practice stop &Uld that all documents be retrieved 
and held for o~. criminal investigation, the immediate need to· oversee document 
preservation and receipt remains. 
. The c51ablishment of an equipped office space should also beain as soon a~ 
possibl~ given·the obvious need fqr Jt_.and the inordinate amount of tim«f'necessary to 
complet~ such a task in Kigali. We have prepared a needs assessment for an ... 
investigative office, a copy of which is attached. 
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